Í fróðlegu vinnuskjali Bank of England má finna neðangreinda klausu, auk ágætra vangaveltna um þá hvata sem valda því þjóðir kjósa (yfirleitt) að standa við skuldbindingar sínar (uppfært: hér fjalla ég um lið 18 í breska samningnum, en sá liður er nr. 16.3 í þeim hollenska).

It was not until the 1970s that the distinction between a sovereign’s commercial activities and its acts of sovereign power became enshrined in major creditors’ laws. In particular, the United States and the United Kingdom enacted the Foreign Sovereigns Immunity and State Immunity Acts in 1976 and 1978 respectively.
Since their enactment it has become common practice for most countries to include a sovereign immunity waiver in their foreign loans and bond contracts which gives commercial creditors the legal right to seek repayment of their loans in the event of  default through seizure of the sovereign’s assets.
(Output costs of sovereign crises / Englandsbanki, Febrúar 2009)
Þar kemur einnig fram að téð ákvæði (Waiver of sovereign immunity), viðlíka því sem birtist í lið 18 í Icesave samningunum, dugi ekki sem hvati að því hin skulduga þjóð greiði kröfur, því ákvæðið snýr að mestu að eigum skuldara í landi lánadrottins, sem duga þá sjaldnast fyrir upphæðinni.

Svona virðist BoE skilja þetta; eigur Íslendinga á Íslandi eru illsnertanlegar.

From a practical perspective, however, the security that creditors have from sovereign immunity waivers is limited. This is because they largely apply to assets held by the defaulting sovereign for commercial activity in the country where the loan or bond contract was issued, which are usually insufficient to cover the amounts due. In addition, a country can attempt to remove its assets from the relevant foreign jurisdiction before it defaults. It is commonly accepted in the literature, therefore, that the threat of seizure of its foreign assets guaranteed by sovereign immunity waivers cannot explain why sovereigns repay their foreign debts.